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VIII. BELIEVING THE SELF-CONTRADICTORY 
John N. Williams 
CLEARLY, 
if a man holds a self-contradictory 
belief, then his belief cannot be rational, for 
there can be no set of evidence sufficient to justify 
it. This is most apparent when the self 
contradictory belief is a belief in a conjunction, 
(e.g., a belief that p & ~p), rather than when it is 
a non-conjunctive self-contradictory belief, e.g., a 
belief that red is not a color. 
Any good evidence for a belief in a conjunction 
is good evidence for a belief of each of the con 
juncts. Something which justifies a belief that p & 
q is something which justifies a belief that p, and 
equally, which justifies a belief that q. But 
whatever is good evidence for a belief that p is 
good evidence against a belief that ~p, and vice 
versa. 
However, epistemologists who are anxious to 
describe the conditions of rational belief, often 
worry1 about whether to include the stipulation 
that a man's belief cannot be rational if it is self 
contradictory. If, as has been argued,2 it is not 
possible to hold a self-contradictory belief, then it 
is redundant to specify lack of self-contradictor 
iness in belief even as a minimal requirement of its 
rationality. 
I shall now present the two most plausible 
arguments for the impossibility of holding self 
contradictory beliefs, and I shall argue that they 
are mistaken. I shall then give some example of 
self-contradictory beliefs. 
I. Believing the Meaningless 
A strong and plausible argument presents itself as 
follows: Unless the substitution-instance for 'p' in 
the expression "A believes that /?" is meaningful, 
then "A believes that/;" is unsatisfied, and is itself 
meaningless. Moreover, where the propositionp is 
a self-contradiction, the expression 'p9 is mean? 
ingless. 
While this argument is plausible, it is mistaken. 
The mistake lies in the minor premise. The 
plausibility of thinking that a sentence of such a 
form as "p & -/?" is meaningless, comes from the 
fact that it does not have any immediately ap? 
parent use. But even if the meaning of a sentence 
is to be identified with its use, although a self 
contradictory sentence has no obvious uses, it has 
uses nonetheless. Notoriously, one can use a self 
contradictory sentence to mean what is not self 
contradictory, as when one says "It's raining and 
yet it isn't" to report a drizzle, or when one replies 
to the question "Is Edward Heath a sailor?" with 
"Yes and No," to report that while Heath is a 
sailor, he is not only a sailor. What one means 
here by uttering the sentence is not what the 
sentence means. And self-contradictory sentences 
have a use in reporting the final step in a reductio 
ad absurdum. 
On the other hand, the fact that self 
contradictory sentences have a meaning, follows 
from the fact that tautologies are true. Since a 
tautologous proposition is true, the sentence that 
expresses it, e.g., "It is not the case thatp & ~pF is 
meaningful. A sentence which is not meaningful 
cannot express a proposition, nor therefore, a true 
proposition. But then the sentence that expresses 
the denial of what this former sentence says, must 
be meaningful also. One could not deny what it 
was meaningless to assert. "Green ideas sleep 
furiously" is meaningless, but so is "Green ideas 
don't sleep furiously."3 
A man must understand what he believes, just 
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as he must be able in some sense to consider what 
he believes. It would be ludicrous to attribute to 
someone, beliefs of things of which he had never 
heard or of which he had no understanding. This, 
together with the comprehension of a normal dog 
explains why it is plausible to say of it that it 
believes that a cat is outide that house but im? 
plausible to say that it believes it will be beaten 
every second Sunday in Lent. Hence, we may say 
that if A believes that p, he grasps the proposition 
p, i.e., is psychologically able to consider this pro? 
position, i.e., understands that which is meant by 
the sentence p. However, the locus of this 
understanding is important. One does not want to 
attribute complex mathematical beliefs to children 
on the grounds that it is logically possible for them 
to consider such things, rather we should say that 
one who believes such things must be psycological 
ly able to consider them.4 Likewise, one neither 
wants to take the view that in believing that/7, one 
understands that p, nor that in believing p, one 
understands the meaning of the sentence p. Were 
the former view advanced, then since understand? 
ing that p entails knowing that p, one would be 
forced into holding the absurd view that one 
knows whatever one believes. 
A history teacher who through the inattention 
of one of his pupils, brings him to believe that the 
Battle of Hastings was fought in 1266, could not 
be said to have thereby brought about an increase 
in the child's understanding. 
Neither grasping the proposition p nor (which 
comes to the same thing) understanding whatever 
is meant by the sentence p entails understanding 
that p. Were the latter view advanced, then in the 
light of animal beliefs one would have to say that 
animals sometimes understand the meaning of 
sentences, which is extremely counter-intuitive, if 
not absurd. A dog might well believe that a cat is 
outside the house, i.e., grasp the proposition that 
a cat is outside the house. Accordingly, it would 
understand whatever is meant by a variety of sen? 
tences, including "A cat is outside the house" and 
"Le chat est au dehors de la maison." But it clearly 
could not (given the capabilities of dogs as we 
know them) understand the meanings of these 
sentences, since to understand the meaning of a 
sentence is both to understand whatever the 
sentence means, i.e., grasp the proposition which 
it expresses, and know that the sentence does 
mean this. Dogs, being not linguistically compe? 
tent, lack this latter piece of knowledge. 
Understanding the meaning of a sentence surely 
involves some further relation or acquaintance 
with it, over and above that involved in 
understanding that which is meant by the 
sentence, i.e., grasping the proposition that it ex? 
presses. While one who understands the meaning 
of a sentence understands what is meant by it, one 
who understands that which is meant by it, does 
not necessarily understand the meaning of the 
sentence. A man who knows no French but who 
understands the meaning of the sentence "The cat 
is on the mat," does not understand the meaning 
of the sentence "Le chat est sur le tapis." Yet since 
he understands the meaning of the English sen? 
tence he understands that which is meant by it, 
i.e., that the cat is on the mat, and this is what is 
meant by the French sentence. Therefore he 
understands what is meant by the French sentence. 
Suppose that the sentence '/?' expresses a 
necessary proposition. A man who understands 
whatever is meant by 'p' need only grasp a 
necessary proposition, i.e., the proposition p. But 
a man who understands the meaning of the sen? 
tence */?' must also grasp a contingent proposition, 
i.e., the proposition that 7?' means that p5. 
If one knows what it is for it to be the case that 
p, then one surely understands what is meant by the 
sentence lp9, i.e. that p. (Notice that this is quite 
different from saying that if one understands what 
is meant by the sentence 'p9, i.e. that p, then one 
understands what it is for it to be the case that p.) 
In this case, a dog can understand what is meant 
by the sentence, e.g. "A cat is outside the house," 
since on a commonsensical level, surely it can 
understand what it is for it to be the case that the 
cat is outside the house. Its pattern of behaviour 
may easily be such as to evince this knowledge by 
evincing its power to discriminate cats from non 
cats, houses from non-houses, and things inside 
the house from things outside. Another way of 
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putting this point is that a dog can believe that the 
cat is outside the house because he can have the 
concepts embodied in the proposition The cat is 
outside the house, i.e. the concepts of a cat, a 
house, and of one thing being outside rather than 
inside. 
Clearly one cannot believe that p if the expres? 
sion *p9 is meaningless, for one cannot then gen? 
uinely consider whether or not p, nor grasp the 
proposition p, for there is no proposition to grasp. 
One cannot believe that green ideas sleep furious? 
ly, or that glub is gluck. If per impossibile, these 
were beliefs, then absurdly, they would be beliefs 
impossible to express, for no-one can express 
nonsense. 
In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein comments that 
The correct explanation of the form of the proposi? 
tion "A makes the judgement p" must show that it is 
impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense6 
Equally, 
Every right theory of judgement must make it im? 
possible for me to judge that "this table penholders 
the book."7 
This correct observation is no bar, however, to 
the self-contradictory being a possible object of 
judgement. Indeed, Wittgenstein talks of self 
contradictions as propositions.8 And although he 
says that contradictions "lack sense,"9 presumably 
in that, like tautologies, they lack poles of truth 
and falsity and "say nothing,"10 at the next turn he 
says correctly that "contradictions are not 
however, nonsensical."11 
As it stands, then, the argument so far con? 
sidered shows only that one cannot believe the 
meaningless, not that one cannot believe the'self 
contradictory. 
II. Understanding What is Believed 
The connection between belief and understand? 
ing which we have just considered now throws up 
another plausible consideration against believing 
what is self-contradictory. As we have seen, a man 
must understand what he believes, but equally, no 
man could understand thai p 8c-p. However, the 
nub of this contention lies in the locus of the 
believer's understanding. If A believes that p, it is 
necessary only that he grasps the proposition p, 
i.e. is psychologically able to consider it, or 
understands whatever is meant by the sentence 'p', 
rather than that he understands what it is for it to 
be the case that p. This is important, for admitted? 
ly, one cannot understand what it is for it to be the 
case that p, if the proposition p is self 
contradictory. Understanding this would be, ab? 
surdly, to know the circumstances in which the im? 
possible was possible. Clearly one can grasp and 
consider a self-contradictory proposition. This is 
what one does in seeing it to be self-contradictory, 
and what one sometimes does in admitting the 
force of reductio attack, for one sees that a conse? 
quence of one's premises is a falsehood, as a result 
of grasping and considering a self-contradiction. 
Likewise, one can understand that which is 
meant by a self-contradictory sentence. For such 
sentences have meanings, and hence meanings that 
can be understood. 
An objection, again plausible, now becomes ap? 
parent. For if in believing, one understands what 
one believes, then is it not the case that in believing 
what is self-contradictory, one understands that it 
is self-contradictory, and hence knows it to be not 
the case? More formally, this objection is that if in 
believing that/? &~p, one grasps the proposition 
p & ~p, and this proposition is self-contradictory, 
then surely one knows that it is not the case the p 
& 
-p. 
However, it is arguable that one can understand 
a self-contradiction and yet not know it to be 
false. This seems implausible only because sym? 
bolising the self-contradictory proposition in a 
form as simple as "p & ~p" makes it perspicuous 
that it is self-contradictory. But surely this 
perspicuity is a matter of contingent psychological 
fact, rather than of logical necessity. Moreover 
there are many self-contradictions, the self 
contradictoriness of which is not perspicuous. 
Where r and s are contradictories, and both long 
and complicated, one might grasp each and under? 
stand that they are conjoined, without realising 
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that r&s is self-contradictory. Yet since one 
understands all the components of this prop? 
osition and the relations which obtain between 
them, one surely grasps the proposition r&s. This 
might be especially true of a self-contradictory 
belief of such a thing as [sx & s2 &...sn & ~(sx8i s2 
& sn)], where n is a large number and where much 
attention is needed to see that each of the 
statements st to sn are included in the negated con? 
junct. 
I shall shortly give three mathematical examples 
of self-contradictory belief, where the believer 
understands what he believes without understand? 
ing that this is self-contradictory. 
Were the objection from understanding correct, 
it would have counterintuitive consequences for 
our cognition of identity-statements. It would be 
rather inconsistent to maintain that whenever one 
understands a self-contradiction one knows it to 
be self-contradictory, and hence false, without 
maintaining that whenever one understands a 
tautology, one knows it to be a tautology, and 
hence true. 
This means that if one believes a tautology, one 
knows it to be true. However, there is much 
debate among philosophers about whether a state? 
ment of the form "N is M" is contingently or 
tautologically true. But since such philosophers 
know that a statement of this form is either con? 
tingently or tautologically true then if they can 
understand the proposition that N is M, then if it 
is a tautology, then on the disputed entailment, 
they would know it is a tautology. And if it is not a 
tautology, then they would not know it was, in 
which case one could tell from the facts that the 
statement that N is M is either contingently or 
tautologically true, that one does not know that it 
is a tautology, and (on the disputed entailment) 
that if it is a tautology then, understanding it one 
knows that it is a tautology; that it was contingent? 
ly true. However it is as absurd to say, in the face 
of such philosophical disagreement, that whether 
an identity statement is contingently or 
tautologically true can be decided in such an easy 
way, as it is to deny that one can understand a 
proposition of the form N is M. 
Consequently, there seems no reason to suppose 
that the truth or falsity of a necessary proposition 
is part of its identity or meaning. 
Nor is it the case that if one knows that it is false 
that p & ~p, (or r & s) one no longer believes thep 
& 
~p.12 It is arguable13 that one can believe that 
contradictory of what one knows, and knowing 
~(p & ~p) and yet believing p & ~p is just a 
sophisticated case of this. A psychiatric patient 
who said emphatically 'People aren't conspiring 
against me, but I can't help believing they are', 
thereby uttering one of Moore's paradoxes, could 
both say something true and in saying it claim to 
know that people aren't conspiring against him in 
which case he would believe the contradictory of 
what he knows. In fact, such a case would be in? 
dicative not only of the fact that the patient 
believes what is not so, but that he knowingly 
believes what he knows is not so. Of course, such a 
belief would be irrational, and it is no accident 
that the relevant example is of a patient with delu? 
sions who would like to believe otherwise but is 
unable to do so. But equally, it is part of the case 
for retaining the avoidance of self-contradictori 
ness in one's beliefs as a minimal requirement of 
their being rational. 
III. Further Objections 
A further possible objection to beliefs of the 
self-contradictory is that "p & ~p" is not the name 
of a possible belief, since if it were, reductio ad ab 
surbum would not work.14 But even if "p & ~p" 
were not the name of a possible belief, *p' and 
* 
~p' 
are. Reductio could proceed by demonstrating 
that if consistent with one's other beliefs one 
should believe that p and believe that ~p, rather 
than proceeding by demonstrating that one should 
believe that p & -p. 
A belief that p & ~p is a belief which is impossi? 
ble to be correct, but this does not show it to be an 
impossible belief.15 Even if believing what is self 
contradictory and holding contradictory beliefs 
were both impossible, reductio could still work. 
For instead of showing an opponent that, to be 
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consistent, he must believe what is impossible to 
be correct, one would now show him that he must 
do what it is impossible to do, i.e., believe what it 
is impossible to believe. This, if anything, is a 
stronger demonstration of a mistake in his argu? 
ment. 
But clearly, a man may express a single belief of 
what is self-contradictory. In the absence of any 
dispositional or philosophical evidence to the con? 
trary, this is a good prima facie reason for suppos? 
ing he holds a self-contradictory belief. 
In fact, many persons have professed single 
beliefs of what was later seen to be self 
contradictory. Hobbes' notorious expression of 
belief that it is logically possible to square the cir? 
cle, (i.e. construct a square equal in area to that of 
a given circle) is itself good reason to suppose that 
he believed that this is logically possible, yet it is 
logically impossible. 
Note that the treatment of this case does not 
commit the intentional fallacy of supposing that 
Hobbes held the self-contradictory belief that 
what is impossible is possible. Indeed what made 
his position notorious was that he expressly denied 
that his belief was self-contradictory. Nonetheless, 
contradictory propositions have subsequently 
been seen to follow from what Hobbes believed, in 
which case what he believed is self-contradictory. 
Mathematics contains examples of people who 
have professed beliefs of what was later seen to en? 
tail contradictories. The early mathematician's at? 
tempt to prove that there is a highest prime 
number, as well as his expression of belief that 
there is such a number, gives every reason to 
ascribe to him, a belief that there is a highest 
prime number. Yet this belief is self 
contradictory, because what is believed entails two 
contradictory things. For, trivially, it follows 
from the fact that there is a highest prime that 
there is a highest prime. Yet equally, it follows 
that there is no highest prime, since as is now well 
known, it is by supposing that there is a highest 
prime that one deduces that it does not exist. 
But there is no reason why this mathematician 
should not understand what he professes to 
believe. If he understands what it is for a number 
to be divisible only by one and by itself, and 
understands what it is for a number of something 
to be the highest possible, he can surely under? 
stand what he believes. This is not, of course, to 
say that he understands that there is a highest 
prime, nor that he understands what it is for it to 
be the case for there to be a highest prime, but 
rather that he understands what is meant by There 
is a highest prime', i.e. grasps the proposition 
which this sentence expresses. 
Suppose someone who is as yet relatively 
elementary in mathematics, believes that triangle 
T is equilateral, and that its perpendicular from 
apex to base is 4 cms, and that one of its angles is 
40?. It is quite plausible to suppose that he may 
believe all of this together, over and above believ? 
ing each of these things in three separate beliefs. 
But in this case, since to believe that p and r and q 
is to believe that p and q, this is to believe that 
triangle 7Ts equilateral and that one of its angles is 
40?, which is in turn to believe what is self 
contradictory. For if a triangle is equilateral then 
all its angles are 60?, i.e. none are 40?, and con? 
versely. Yet the believer may understand what he 
believes, i.e. understand what is meant by 
"Triangle Tis equilateral," i.e. that triangle Thas 
all sides of equal length, and understand what is 
meant by "One of the angles is 40?," i.e. that one 
of the three angles is four ninths of a right angle, 
and moreover understand a sentence that says that 
both of these things, which he understands, are 
the case together, in which case he understands 
what he believes. Of course, there is no reason to 
suppose that in understanding a sentence that says 
that both of these things are the case together, one 
needs to know that they cannot both be the case 
together. This does not follow from understand? 
ing what each of the component sentences says 
and understanding that what is said by a sentence 
of which these are components, is that what both 
of these component sentences says is the case 
together. 
A more advanced mathematician approaching 
the result of a complicated calculation, may form 
the belief that the result is a prime number be? 
tween 9257 and 9277. He can understand what he 
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here believes, in understanding what it is for a 
number to be prime, i.e. divisible only by itself or 
by one, and in understanding what it is for a 
number to be between 9257 and 9277, and 
moreover, understanding that what the sentence 
"The result is a prime between 9257 and 9277" 
means, i.e. that both of what he understands in 
the two former instances is both so. There is no 
reason to invoke any need for him to understand 
that what he understands in the two former in? 
stances cannot both be so, which is in fact the 
case. For what this mathematician believes is a 
self-contradiction, because what he believes en? 
tails two contradictory things. 
Trivially, that the result is a prime number be? 
tween 9257 and 9277, entails that the result is a 
prime number. But that the result is a prime 
number between 9257 and 9277, entails that the 
result is a number between 9257 and 9277. That 
the result is a number between 9257 and 9277 en? 
tails that it is not a prime number. Consequently 
what the mathematician believes entails two 
things, and these things are contradictories, name? 
ly that the result is a prime number on the one 
hand and that the result is not a prime number, on 
the other. 
Hence, what he believes is self-contradictory. 
I have argued that these beliefs are self 
contradictory because what is believed entails two 
contradictory things. This is not to say, however, 
that the believer must of necessity believe each of 
these contradictory things. The fact that what the 
mathematician believes both entails that the result 
is a prime number and entails that it is not a prime 
number, shows his belief to be self-contradictory, 
but it does not show that he must in addition 
believe that the result is a prime number and 
believe that it is not a prime number. 
The only reason one could have for denying this 
is the view that one always believes the entailments 
of what one believes. This is mistaken. 
If figure F is equilateral then it is equiangular 
and conversely, but the sentences "Figure F is 
equilateral" and "Figure F is equiangular" express 
different propositions, since equilaterality is a dif? 
ferent concept from that of equiangularity. 
Hence, a man might believe e.g., that figure F is 
equilateral without believing that it is equiangular. 
He may either not happen to hold this latter belief, 
as when he fails to realise that if F is equilateral 
then it is equiangular, or he may be incapable of 
holding it as when he is not psychologically able to 
consider the proposition Figure F is equiangular, 
e.g., because he has the concept of equilaterality 
but not that of equiangularity. 
Since anything and everything follows from a 
self-contradiction, then since, as I have argued, it 
is possible for a man to hold a self-contradictory 
belief, then it should be possible, on the disputed 
view, for him to hold any and every belief, in? 
cluding every belief that has been held, or will be 
held, by anyone, on any subject, even concerning 
matters of fact of things now non-existent. This is 
surely not humanly possible. 
Last, an infinite number of things follow from 
it being the case that p. i.e., thatp or q, thatp or r, 
that p or s... and so on ad infinitum. Likewise it 
follows that p or q or r or s... and so on ad in? 
finitum. But even if it is possible for a man to hold 
an infinity of beliefs or a belief of infinite com? 
plexity, one who believed thatp would not hold an 
infinity of beliefs or an infinitely complex belief of 
the sort above mentioned. For inevitably, sooner 
or later there will occur something of which the 
believer has never heard, e.g., that s. Perhaps s is a 
proposition in biology and the believer has no 
understanding of anything in biology. In this case 
he cannot believe that s. But equally, neither can 
he believe that p or q or r or s.17 
The University of Hull, England Received June 3,1980 
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8. Tractatus 4.46, 5.152. 
9. Ibid, AMI. 
10. See Tractatus 5.43, 4.462, 6.1264. 
11. Ibid, 4.4611. 
12. As Cooper assumes. Op cit. p. 56. 
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14. This objection was first put to me, in correspondence, by Christopher Bryant, but I have heard it raised since in subsequent 
discussions. 
15. Cf. Nicholas Rescher and Robert Brandom's point that a consistent account of an inconsistent object of consideration is 
perfectly possible. The Logic of Inconsistency (Oxford, 1980), pp. 138-39. 
16. L.J. Comrie, Chambers Six Figure Mathematical Tables, vol. II (Edinburgh, 1963), pp. 490-91. 
17. I am grateful to Paul Gilbert and Michael More for their criticisms of an earlier version of this paper. 
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